EAD Calibration for Corporate Credit Lines
Managing the credit risk inherent to a corporate credit line is similar to that of a term loan, but with one key difference. For both instruments, the bank should know the borrower's probability of default (PD) and the facility's loss given default (LGD). However, since a credit line allows the borrowers to draw down the committed funds according to their own needs, the bank must also have a measure of the line's exposure at default (EAD). In fact, EAD is one of the key parameters used for regulatory capital calculations within the Basel II
Framework. Yet, relatively few empirical studies of EAD for corporate credit lines have been published, mainly due to a lack of data. A primary goal of this article is to provide calibrated values for use in EAD calculations for corporate credit lines.
Our study is based on the Spanish credit register, which provides a census of all corporate lending within Spain over the last twenty years. The length and breadth of this dataset allows us to provide the most comprehensive overview of corporate credit line use and EAD calculations to date. Our analysis shows that defaulting firms have significantly higher credit line usage rates and EAD values up to five years prior to their actual default.
Furthermore, we find that there are important variations in EAD values due to credit line size, collateralization, and maturity. While our results are derived from data for a single country, they should provide useful benchmarks for further academic, business and policy research into this under-developed area of credit risk management.
Definitions and literature review
Bank credit lines are a major source of funding and liquidity for firms. For example, Sufi (2008) found that credit lines account for over 80% of the bank financing provided to U.S. public firms, while Kashyap et al. (2002) found that 70% of bank borrowing by U.S. small firms is through credit lines. For Spanish firms, the subject of our study, credit lines account for an average of 42% of firms' bank financing and 32% of banks' total new lending.
To set our terminology clearly, we define a corporate credit line as a loan commitment in which the borrower has the option to draw down funds up to the commitment amount under certain conditions. For risk management purposes, a bank's EAD through credit line i at time t for a default horizon τ, which we denote as EAD it (τ), is the sum of the actual drawn amount at time t and a fraction of the undrawn amount, where that fraction takes into account the default horizon. This fraction is commonly known as the loan equivalent amount (LEQ) and is the key parameter in EAD estimation and calibration.
1 Using notation, Three empirical studies providing calibrated LEQ estimates are publicly available. Asarnow and Marker (1995) present LEQ estimates based on credit lines issued by Citibank to publicly-rated North American firms over the five-year period from 1987 to 1992. They report an average LEQ value of just over 60% with a roughly downward sloping trend from 69% for AAA-rated firms to 44% for CCC-rated firms. The intuition behind this trend is that in case of default, lower-rated firms typically have already drawn down a reasonable portion of their credit lines and are less likely to drawn down as much of their remaining commitment as highly-rated firms.
The LEQ estimates provided by Araten and Jacobs (2001) Across default horizons, he found that LEQ it (τ) was a generally increasing function of τ, ranging from 33% at one year prior to default to 48% at four years prior. However, the LEQ value declined to 26% at five years prior to default, perhaps in part due to the few datapoints available in the sample. Credit ratings also had a negative relationship with average LEQ values in this study, ranging from 76% for BBB-rated firms to 22% for D-rated firms. While commitment size and collateral rank had positive, but relatively small, effects on LEQ values, other firm characteristics, such as profit, did have a statistically significant effect.
Our data and calibration methods Our LEQ estimates are based on the Spanish credit register, which is known as the
Central de Información de Riesgos (CIR)
, and is maintained by the Banco de España. The CIR contains information on all corporate loan commitments of more than €6,000 granted by any bank operating in Spain over the twenty-year period from 1984 to 2005; see Jiménez et al. (2008) for a more detailed description of the database and its coverage of corporate credit lines. The definition of default used in the CIR database is that the borrower has loan payments overdue by more than 90 days, which is the legal definition of default in Spain, or that it has been classified as a doubtful borrower by the bank (i.e., the lender believes there is a high probability of non-payment). As shown in Table 1 , the number of defaults rose sharply during the recessionary period of 1993 and declined at a relatively slow pace until 2005.
Our database consists of new corporate credit. Despite the fact that most credit lines nominally have a maturity of one year or less, it is common to find them in the database again the following year with exactly the same characteristics (in particular, their commitment size) and changing only in the amount drawn. For our analysis, we assume it is the same credit line, and we classify the observations as having both short maturities and line ages greater than their recorded maturities. After filtering the data, our sample includes 696,445 credit lines granted to 334,442 firms by 404 banks. The commitment size has an interquartile range of between €30,000 and €150,000 with a median value of €60,000. Our sample clearly contains more small business loans than examined in the previously noted studies. Of these lines, 4,289 of them were granted to 4,094 firms that defaulted; these lines have an interquartile range of between €30,000 and €96,000 with a median value of €48,000. Figure 1 presents the histogram of our credit line usage rates across firms and time, where the usage rate RDRAWN it is calculated as it it it it DRAWN RDRAWN . DRAWN UNDRAWN = + While just over 23% of the credit line-year observations amass at the endpoints, the remaining 77% are distributed almost symmetrically around the median value of 50%.
When analyzing credit line usage rates, we find that firms that default on their credit lines draw down more funds than firms that do not default, even up to five years before the default year; see Jiménez et al. (2008) for complete details of this analysis. At five years prior, the average usage rate for defaulting firms is about 25% higher than that of nondefaulting firms. As default approaches, these firms draw down their credit lines at an increasing rate. At the default year, the average usage ratio for defaulting firms is 75% larger than that for non-defaulting. The empirical insight that defaulting firms exhibit higher usage rates up to five years prior to defaulting suggests a potentially important link between PD and EAD modeling.
LEQ calibration results
As Moral (2006) for further details. The patterns of the LEQ values derived from this procedure as applied to our dataset are similar to those presented here, although their level is roughly ten percentage points higher.
The average LEQ value for the entire dataset is 59.6%, which is in line with the value reported by Asarnow and Marker (1995) and higher than that reported by Araten and Jacobs (2001) as well as Jacobs (2008 Figure 2 , we find an upward sloping pattern, as in Araten and Jacobs (2001) as well as Jacobs (2008) . However, the magnitudes of our estimates are higher and range from 48% at one year prior to default to 76% at five years prior to default. In other words, in our dataset, firms that will default on their credit lines in five years time can be expected to draw down, on average, about three-quarters of their undrawn commitments, and this value declines to 50% in the year prior to default.
We also find that the commitment size, collateralization and maturity of the credit lines has an effect on the calibrated LEQ it (τ) patterns. As shown in Figure 3 and Table 2 , the largest credit lines (i.e., the fourth size quartile) have the lowest LEQ values at all default horizons, perhaps since the larger firms that can get larger credit lines from their banks have access to other funding sources and are less likely to use their credit lines, even as default approaches.
Regarding collateral, higher-quality borrowers should be willing to provide collateral as a signal of their confidence in their repayment ability, as discussed by Jiménez et al. (2006) . This assumption would suggest lower LEQ values as these borrowers would be less likely to draw down their lines, even if they eventually default, in order to protect their collateral from being seized. Figure 4 and Table 3 present empirical results that support this hypothesis. While the average LEQ it (τ) values at the longer default horizons are essentially the same, they are significantly different at the 1% significance level for the default horizons from one to three years. The difference is particularly stark at one year prior to default where uncollateralized lines see over half of their available commitments drawn down, whereas collateralized lines only experience a 30% drawn rate, on average. Figure 5 and 
